Beckett's The Real Thing

Count me in with Rich Lederer in thinking that the Nation did well to land Josh Beckett.

Alex and I visited this issue in detail yesterday off-line, although we were then focused on the possibility of a Blalock deal with the Rangers.

At the time, I had Beckett’s 2004 stats handy. As we all know, his decision record was unremarkable (9-9), but a casual glance reveals that his BAA was .226 and his K/9 were 8.73 over 157 IP and 26 starts.

Because I’m in a points league, I calculate a measure of point production per inning, independent of decisions and stamina. It’s quite straightforward: (SO-BB)/IP gives you Points Per Inning or PPI.

Beckett’s 0.63 PPI is the same as the much hyped AJ Burnett, and in the top-15 of all starting pitchers in both leagues. And he’s no one-season wonder: Beckett topped 0.60 PPI again in 2005.

For comparison, Randy Johnson was best in the 2004 season with a PPI of 1.00, Sheets and Santana crested 0.90, and Smoltz and Perez topped 0.80. There were five pitchers over 0.70 (Schmidt, Prior, Martinez, Schilling, Peavy).

The lesson in this, as in all matters involving baseball talent, is that the drop-off in production is steep: the group of superstar pitchers is very small.

Looking at the company Beckett kept in 2004, there were six other pitchers clustered from 0.66 to 0.61 PPI: Wood, Clemens, Carpenter, Beckett, Burnett, Clement, Oswalt.

That’s pretty illustrious company. Now take a look at their 2004 win-loss records (presented in descending order of individual PPI):
Wood 8-9
Clemens 18-4
Carpenter 15-5
Beckett 9-9
Burnett 7-6
Clement 9-13
Oswalt 20-10.

The bottom line is that any starting pitcher whose PPI is in Beckett’s class has a solid chance of turning-in 15 or 20 win seasons (as Beckett finally did in 2005, going 15-8 with essentially the same per-inning performance as 2004).

Go one more step down in the pitching pool, and the chances of 15 or 20 wins becomes very slim. Take one of these top-15 pitchers and give them run support (e.g. Oswalt, Carpenter, Clemens), and you turn the odds dramatically in your favour.

There are five lessons I draw from these numbers, all of which point to Boston having made a solid acquisition:

(1) Josh Beckett is a very good pitcher who will consistently deliver so-called “quality starts.” His multi-year performance at that level (unlike Matt Clement) is cause for confidence.

(2) Beckett’s only apparent weakness, which is cause for concern among the commentariat, is that he’s averaged 6 innings a start, and has an injury history. Please see point 1. The 6 innings Beckett pitches will be among the best in the league. It’s better for Boston, or any team, to have a an elite starter for 6 innings than a mediocre starter over 7+.

(3) Beckett’s stamina/injury history (see point 2) has implications for bullpen depth, but those implications are manageable. It’s time to sign a good middle reliever.

(4) Beckett is 25 years old and has several seasons under his belt. Boston is not just a better team for the 2006 season, but for 2007 and beyond if they can retain his services. And there is every chance Beckett will continue to physically develop to the point where he hits 200 innings. But why risk it if you don’t need to?

(5) Who cares about Mike Lowell? Just add the two salaries up and call that the ‘true cost’ for Josh Beckett. Lowell can warm the bench, spell the Greek, or be moved somewhere else to recover part of his salary.

It’s a shame for Beckett that he’s the bait the Marlins used to unload the Lowell contract, and a shame for Marlins fans (they are out there) that the team is again dumping salary. Hot prospects are no replacement for a proven young performer entering his prime.

As dreadful as Lowell is, the Marlins haven’t even managed to replace his production – or step-up with a slugger like Blalock – unless and until soon-to-be rookie Hanley Ramirez realizes his potential.

The Marlins are now financially stronger, but weaker in pitching, batting and fielding. And while there’s a ready market to make-up the lost lineup production, elite pitching is harder to acquire.

But if the money they’ve saved buys Florida a Washburn or even a Weaver, then the equation on talent may come out even or in their favour in the short term, and the Marlins will have gotten younger at the same time. If the Marlins spend well, rather than pocket the cash, there’s still a chance this was a genuine win-win deal.